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Notes
REPUDIATION BY SUPREME CounT OF RULE OF Coolidge v. Long
IN INHERITANCE TAXATION
WHEN a donor transfers property by an irrevocable deed of trust, but retains
for himself a life interest in the property, a tax upon "transfers intended to
take effect in possession or enjoyment at or after the death of the grantor"'
may be imposed only if the succession to the property is said not to be com-
pleted until the donor's death. For, if the succession is complete when the
deed is executed, the transfer is not testamentary but is a gift inter Vuivos,
upon -which neither a transfer nor a succession tax may be imposed.2
The majority of state courts have held that "succession" is effected under
such a deed of trust only when the donees acquire actual possession or enjoy-
ment of the property, even though all their rights to the property became
vested upon the execution of the deed.3 A few courts, on the other hand,
have taken the more technical view that the succession is complete when the
right to possession or enjoyment becomes vested upon execution of the deed,
and have held that no inheritance tax can be imposed because the death of
the donor is not the generating source of any right in the donees. 4 But, if
the deed is revocable, 5 or if the grantor reserves the power of appointing the
beneficiaries of the trust,6 or if he retains any other control over the propertyT
1. Statutes taxing such transfers are common, being in effect in at least
forty-one states and territories. See dissent of ir. Justice Roberts in Coolidge
v. Long, 282 U. S. 582, 607 (1931).
2. Schlesinger v. Wisconsin, 270 U. S. 230 (1926); Heiner v. Donnan, 285
U. S. 312 (1932).
3. Harber v. Whelchel, 156 Ga. 601, 119 S. E. 695 (1923); People v. Moir,
207 I1. 180, 69 N. E. 905 (1904); In. re Marshall's Estate, 179 Minn. 233,
228 N. W. 920 (1930) ; In re Estate of Schuh, 66 Mont. 50, 212 Pac. 516 (1923) ;
Farmers' Loan and Trust Co. v. Bugbee, 6 N. J. Mis. R. 415, 141 AtI. 579
(1928). But where the possession of the income is postponed only for the
purpose of accumulation the transfer is not taxable. People v. Northern Trust
Co., 330 Ill. 238, 161 N. E. 525 (1928). For a full discussion see lRottschaefer,
Taxation of Transfers Intended to Take Effect in Possession or Enjoyraent at
Grantor's Death (1930) 14 MINN. L. REv. 452.
4. Hunt v. Wicht, 174 Cal. 205, 162 Pac. 639 (1917); Brown v. Pennsyl-
vania Co., 32 Del. 525, 126 Atl. 715 (1924); Houston's Estate, 276 Pa. 330,
120 Atl. 267 (1923).
5. Saltonstall v. Saltonstall, 276 U. S. 260 (1928); Chase National Bank v.
United States, 278 U. S. 327 (1929); Smith v. State, 134 Mid. 473, 107 AUt.
255 (1919); In re Fulham's Estate, 96 Vt. 308, 119 Atl. 433 (1923).
6. Orr V. Gilman, 183 U. S. 278 (1901); Chanler v. Kelsey, 205 U. S. 460
(1907); Minot v. Stevens, 207 Mass. 588, 93 N. E. 973 (1911).
7. People v. McCormick, 327 I11. 547, 158 N. E. 861 (1927) (donor to desig-
nate charities to which income shall be paid); Lilly v. State, 156 Bid. 94, 143
Atl. 661 (1928) (donor to retain power to sell and mortgage property); State
and City Bank v. Doughton, 188 N. C. 762, 125 S. E. 621 (1924) (donor to
retain right to vote stock).
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the rights of the beneficiaries do not vest absolutely until the death of the
grantor, and a tax may be imposed.
The United States Supreme Court in interpreting the Federal Estate Tax s
in similar situations originally adopted the minority rule that no tax might be
imposed when the grantees' rights vested during the grantor's life even though
possession of the property passed only at his death.
9 The same rule was
applied by the Court to the state succession tax involved in Coolidge v Long.
10
In that case a statute levying a succession tax 1" had been enacted after an
irrevocable deed of trust had given certain grantees vested rights in property,
but before the grantor's death had given them possession of it. The Court,
holding that the death of the grantor was not "a generating source of any
right in the remaindermen" 12 and that therefore succession had been effected
upon delivery of the deed, ruled that the tax provided in the statute there-
after enacted could not be imposed without violating the contract clause of
the Federal Constitution. Following this decision the Court retreated some-
what from its position. In per curiam opinions the Court sustained the im-
position of the Federal Estate Tax when the grantor had retained a life
interest in the property, even though irrevocable deeds .of trust had given the
grantees vested rights during the grantor's life.13  The Court also held that
a gift in contemplation of death could be taxed at a rate imposed by a statute
enacted after the gift was made. 14 And the Court recently overruled a dictum
in the Coolidge case by sanctioning the imposition of a transfer tax upon the
estate of a deceased tenant by the entirety, although the estate had been
created prior to the taxing act.15
8. 40 STAT. 1096 (1919), 26 U. S. C. § 1136-4(c) (1926) ; amended, 46 STAT.
1516 (1931), 26 U. S. C. SuPP. VI § 1136-4(c) (1932). Although the Estate Tax
is imposed upon the right to transfer property while the succession taxes are
imposed upon the right to receive it, gifts by deeds of trust should be equally
taxable under either, since the nature of the tax cannot alter the time at
which succession is completed.
9. Nichols v. Coolidge, 274 U. S. 531 (1927); Reinecke v. Northern Trust
Co., 278 U. S. 339 (1929); May v. Heiner, 281 U. S. 238 (1930).
10. 282 U. S. 582 (1931); noted in (1931) 44 HARv. L. Rnv. 1103; (1931)
29 MicH. L. Rnv. 1095; (1931) 15 MINN. L. REv. 726; (1931) 40 YALE L. 3.
1331.
11. The tax in that case was the familiar one imposed upon "transfers
intended to take effect in possession and enjoyment after the grantor's death."
MASs. GEN. LAws (1932) c. 65 § 1.
12. Coolidge v. Long, 282 U. S. 582, 597 (1931). The state court had
upheld the tax on the ground that the date of the grantor's death was the
date of effective succession and that therefore the statute was not retroactive.
Coolidge v. Commissioner, 268 Mass. 443, 167 N. E. 757 (1929).
13. Burnet v. Northern Trust Co., 283 U. S. 782 (1931); Morseman v.
Burnet, 283 U. S. 783 (1931); McCormick v. Burnet, 283 U. S. 784 (1931),
all decided March 2, 1931.
14. Milliken v. United States, 283 U. S. 15 (1931).
15. Gwinn v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 53 Sup. Ct. 157 (1932).
The holding in Tyler v. United States, 281 U. S. 497 (1930), had been limited
in the Coolidge case (282 U. S. at 599) to apply only where "the estate was
created after the passage of the applicable Act."
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This series of cases reached its culmination in the Court's recent decision
in Guaranty Trust Co. v. Blodgett.16 A donor transferred securities to a
trustee by an irrevocable deed of trust which provided for the payment of
the income to the donor for life17 and for delivery of the principal thereafter
to the donor's daughter.'S Upon the donor's death a succession tax was
imposed by the state.'9 The Connecticut Supreme Court of Errors upheld
the tax on the ground that the legislature intended it to be levied upon the
shifting of possession or enjoyment,20 and impliedly ruled that succession is
not complete under such a deed of trust until the donor's death. The
decedent's executor appealed to the Federal Supreme Court, contending that
succession -was completed by the execution of the deed and that therefore a
succession tax could not be imposed consistently with due process.2  The Court
in a brief opinion accepted the state court's construction of the statute and
held that the imposition of the tax did not violate the Constitution.
Implicit in the decision of the Court in the Blodgett case is approval of the
view that succession is not completed until the donee obtains actual possession
of the property, even though the donee's rights become vested upon execution
of the deed. This decision seems directly contrary to Coolidge -v. Long.23 In
that case the Court could not have held that imposition of the tax would give
retroactive effect to the statute without first holding that the succession was
completed upon execution of the deed.2  The Court in the Blodgctt case relied
upon a dictum in the Coolidge case to the effect that a tax upon the shifting
of possession or enjoyment might be constitutionally imposed if the taxdng
act took effect before the deed was executed.24 But the prior enactment of
the taxing act could not make a gift inter vivos subject to an inheritance
tax. The Court's dictum therefore, was contrary to its decision in the Coolidge
case.
The principal case is an indication that, for the time being at least, the
16. 53 Sup. Ct. 244 (1933).
17. After the donor's death the income was to go to her husband for his
life; but, though it does not appear, he apparently predeceased her.
18. If the daughter did not survive, the principal was to go to her issue
with a gift over in the absence of such issue.
19. The taxing statute was almost identical with that involved in Coolidge
v. Long. See note 11, supra.
20. Blodgett v. Guaranty Trust Co., 114 Conn. 207, 153 AUt. 245 (1932).
21. The appellant also urged that while the state court applied the Act
in force when the deed was e-xecited (CONN. PuB. AcTs (1923) c. 190, § 1),
it in reality relied on the Act passed after the deed was made (Corm. PUB.
AcTs (1929) c. 299 §§ 1, 2) and that therefore the contract clause was violated.
The Supreme Court rejected this contention.
22. It is interesting to note that even if there had been no question of
retroactivity in the Coolidge case the tax could not validly have been imposed
for the court decided that the transfer was a gift in pracseii. See note 2,
supra.
23. In both the Coolidge case and the Blodgctt case there were such con-
stitutional questions involved as would enable the Supreme Court to review
the state court's interpretation of the transaction. See Railroad Commission
v. Eastern Texas Rr. Co, 264 U. S. 79, 86 (1924).
24. Coolidge v. Long, 282 U. S. 582, 596 (1931). The dictum, however, is
consistent with earlier pronouncements by the Court. Wright v. Blakeslee,
101 U. S. 174 (1879); Nickel v. Cole, 256 U. S. 222 (1921).
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Supreme Court will be loath to interfere with the imposition of inheritance
taxes by Congress .or by the state legislatures. Statutes taxing transfers
intended to take effect at the death of the grantor are enacted to prevent
evasion of the death duties. Consequently in determining the imposition of
the tax, the substance of the transfers rather than the legal technicalities
involved should have governing force.
SCOPE OF FEDERAL RADio COMMISSION'S POWER ovER LicENsEs
IN Federal Radio Commission v. Nelson Brothers' Bond & Mortgage Co.1 the
Supreme Court for the first time 2 passed upon the power of the Federal Radio
Commission to regulate the business of broadcasting. In the Radio Act of
1927,3 the only rule set forth for the Commission's guidance in granting or
refusing license applications was that the "public convenience, interest or
necessit*" be served thereby. The following year the Davis Amendment
4
added the requirement that "the licensing authority shall as nearly as pos-
sible make and maintain an equal allocation of broadcasting licenses ..."
among the various zones; "and shall make fair and equitable allocation of
licenses ...to each of the states ...within each zone, according to popula-
tion." Under the system adopted by the Commission in 1930 to comply with
the Amendment,5 Illinois was 55% over, and Indiana 22% under, its prescribed
quota. Largely on this ground, the Commission in the instant case disregarded
an examiner's recommendation and granted the petition of WJKS, an Indiana
station which sought to change its frequency to, and acquire a clear channel
on, a frequency previously shared by two Illinois broadcasters which had been
rendering satisfactory service. A further basis for its decision was the finding
that programs similar to those offered by the Illinois stations could be picked
up elsewhere on the dial by their public, while WJKS, the only station giving
good service to the region around Gary, consciously adapted its programs to
the type of listeners it served.0 The decision of the Commission was reversed
1. 53 Sup. Ct. 627 (1933).
2. In Federal Radio Commission v. General Electric Co., 281 U. S. 464
(1930), the Court refused to review a decision of the Court of Appeals for
the District of Columbia reversing an order of the Commission, on the ground
that the Act constituted the District Court of Appeals a superior administrative
board whose decisions did not create a judicial question reviewable by the
Supreme Court. Congress promptly amended the Act to limit review by the
Court of Appeals to questions of law (see note 11, infra), thus obviating the
Court's objection that no "case or controversy" was presented for its decision.
3. 44 STAT. 1162-74 (1927), 47 U. S. C. SUP. VI §§ 81-121 (1932). The
Commission is authorized to assign frequencies and powers "from time to
time as public convenience, interest or necessity requires." 44 STAT. 1163
(1927), 47 U. S. C. SUPPo VI § 84 (1932).
4. 45 STAT. 373 (1928), 47 U. S. C. Surr. VI § 89 (1932). The expressed
purpose of the Amendment is to secure "equality of radio broadcasting service,
both of transmission and of reception," to the people of the zones established
by § 2 of the Act.
5. General Order No. 87, Report, Federal Radio Commission (1930) 19.
6. The population in and around Gary contains a high percentage of foreign
born and many diverse nationalities. WJKS featured talks in different
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by the Court of Appeals for the -District of Columbia 1 as "arbitrary and
capricious" 8 in that it deprived established stations in good standing of their
right to broadcast. The Supreme Court, however, reversed the District Court
of Appeals on the ground that that court should not have substituted its own
conclusions for those of the Commission. The effect of the decision is apparently
to rule the two Illinois stations off the air.9
Since the power of the Commission to deny licenses and to refuse to renew
those of established stations is no longer open to question,10 the only issue
before the Court was whether the Commission's finding that public interest,
convenience and necessity would be served by the granting of the application
should be reversed. And here the Court properly adopted a policy of non-
interference and declined to disturb a decision which could not be said to be
unsupported by evidence. The provision in the Act making the Commission's
findings of fact conclusive unless "arbitrary or capricious," 1 coupled with
the vagueness of the test adopted for passing upon applications, 12 clearly indi-
cates the intention of Congress to leave the Commission free from judicial
interference in its supervision of radio. The desirability of such administra-
tive independence is apparent, since the decisions which the Commission is
called upon to make require a technical knowledge beyond the courts. Further-
more, the principles by which broadcasting is to be regulated should be worked
out by trial and error, a method to which legalistic reliance on precedent is
singularly ill-fitted.13 Adherence by the Court to the attitude taken in the
principal case will keep the law of broadcasting free of a rigidity which might
otherwise hamper future development.
From an administrative standpoint, however, the wisdom of the Commis-
sion's decision is open to question. Admittedly, in the instant case, the stated
intention of the Commission was to foster the purpose of Congress, as expressed
in the Davis Amendment, to equalize the distribution of broadcasting facilities.
And some precedent for so rigid a compliance with the Amendment may be
found in the radical changes in station assignments made in 192814 and again
languages on community organization, safety devices used in the mills, good
citizenship, et cetera.
7. 62 F. (2d) 854 (App. D. C. 1932).
8. Id. at 857. See note 11, infra.
9. Such is the assumption of both the Supreme Court and the District
Court of Appeals. What disposition was to be made of the frequency abandoned
by WJKS is not stated.
10. United States v. American Bond & Mortgage Co., 31 F. (2d) 448 (N. D.
Ill. 1929), aff'd, 52 F. (2d) 318 (C. C. A. 7th, 1931), cert. den. 285 U. S. 538
(1931); Trinity Methodist Church v. Federal Radio Commission, 62 F. (2d)
850 (App. D. C. 1932). Cf. Union Bridge Co. v. United States, 204 U. S. 364
(1907).
11. 46 STAT. 844 (1930), 47 U. S. C. Supp. VI § 96d (1932).
12. The standard of "public convenience, interest or necessity" has been
praised as being sufficiently vague to give the Commission free rein in
its judgments. Caldwell, The Standard of Public Intcrest, Convenienco or
Necessity as Used in the Radio Act of 1927 (1930) 1 Am LaW REV. 295.
13. Ashby, Legal Aspects of Radio Broadcasting (1930) 1 Am LAw Ruv.
331, 347-8. The author has reference to legislative rather than judicial inter-
ference, but his arguments seem equally applicable to the instant situation.
14. General Order No. 40, Report, Federal Radio Commission (1928) 48.
in 1930.15 Until its present decision, however, the Commission had denied re-
newals of licenses only to those stations that had failed to fulfill its require-
ments 16 and had limited its application of the Davis Amendment, which has
been severely criticized,"7 to rejecting new applications from areas with full
quotas1s Thus where a station in an under-quota state and zone sought an
increase in power which would necessitate interference with established stations
in an over-quota state, the Amendment was regarded as only one of several
factors bearing upon the public interest and the petition denied.19 This policy
is in accord with that of state public utility commissions which, in analogous
situations, 20 protect existing utilities by refusing certificates of public con-
venience and necessity to companies seeking to operate in a territory already
adequately served.21  Considering the substantial investments at stake, 22 it
would seem that in the absence of more compelling reasons than those set forth
in the instant litigation23 the Commission should not depart from such a
policy.
15. See note 5, supra.
16. Chicago Federation of Labor v. Federal Radio Commission, 41 F. (2d)
422 (App. D. C. 1930); Report, Federal Radio Commission (1929) 32. But
cf. Great Lakes Broadcasting Co. v. Federal Radio Commission, 37 F. (2d) 993
(App. D. C. 1930).
17. The criticism has been to the effect that the Amendment is based upon
political considerations and is unsound from an engineering standpoint.
Masters, Construction of the Equality Clause in the Davis Amendmcnt (1931)
1 J. RADIo LAw 1, 5-10; Caldwell, supra note 12, at 299; Note (1930) 28 Miotl.
L. REv. 1032, 1039.
18. Report, supra note 14, at 166. Cf. Ansley v. Federal Radio Commission,
46 F. (2d) 600 (App. D. C. 1930); Westinghouse Electric & Manufacturing
Co. v. Federal Radio Commission, 47 F. (2d) 415 (App. D. C. 1931); Durham
Life Insurance Co. v. Federal Radio Commission, 55 F. (2d) 537 (App. D. (.
1931). -
19. Reading Broadcasting Co. v. Federal Radio Commission, 48 F. (2d) 458
(App. D. C. 1931). Accord: Strawbridge & Clothier v. Federal Radio Com-
mission, 57 F. (2d) 434 (App. D. C. 1932); Note (1931) 1 J. RADIo LAw 134.
20. Both the Radio Commission and public utility commissions are con-
fronted with the problem of receiving more applications than they can grant.
In the case of the Commission physical limitations prevent more than two
or three stations from using the same frequency without disastrous inter-
ference, while in the case of the utility boards the reasons are economic, the
competition resulting from operating two utilities in the same area making
it impossible for either to earn a fair profit; but the problem before both is
similar. See Caldwell, supra note 12, at 308-13.
21. Commissions: Re City Cab Service, P. U. R. 1930A, 113 (Conn. P. U. C.
1929); Re Cannonball Express Co., P. U: R. 1929A, 131 (Wis. R. C. 1928).
Courts: McLain v. Public Utilities Commission, 110 Ohio St. 1, 143 N. E. 381
(1924); Abbott v. Public Utilities Commission, 48 R. I. i96, 136 At. 490 (1927).
22. Station WIBO, one of those deleted, had been in operation since 1925,
employed 55 persons, had average monthly expenses of $17,000, and represented
an investment of $346,000. 53 Sup. Ct. at 631.
23. The decisions of the Federal Radio Commission are not reported. The
Commission's summary of its findings in the present case is reprinted in the
opinion of the Supreme Court, 53 Sup. Ct. at 631.
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VAnI.iTY OF FEDERAL ESTATE TAX ON SEcuRITIEs OwNED By
NoN-REsIDENT ALuEN
A FEDERAL estate tax was levied on foreign stocks and foreign and domestic
bonds owned by a British subject who resided in Cuba at the time of his death.
The securities were held in New York by representatives of the deceased for
the sole purpose of collecting the income. The Supreme Court, after determining,
not without difficulty, that the legislative intent was to include the securities
in question within the provisions of the Revenue Act,' decided that the tax
did not violate the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment,- even though
an inheritance tax levied by a state upon a non-resident who owned securities
physically within its borders would be invalid under the Fourteenth Amend-
ment.3
The jurisdiction of a state to levy an inheritance tax has been defined in
terms of due process, but until recently the meaning of due process in this
connection has been far from intelligible. The decisions of the Supreme Court
in the past decade, however, show a clearly defined trend toward an inter-
pretation of the provision in the light of considerations of policy.4 Where for-
merly a non-domiciliary state's imposition of an inheritance tax had been
upheld as not contravening the Fourteenth Amendmentr, the same tax has
now been condemned for the reason that "practical considerations of wisdom,
convenience, and justice alike dictate the desirability of a uniform general rule
confining the jurisdiction to impose death transfer taxes as to intangibles to
the state of the domicile." G Due process has therefore been said to prohibit
taxing of intangibles by a non-domiciliary state, even though, according to the
dissentients, it may accord them or their transfer benefits and protection that
might reasonably be regarded as sufficient to support a tax. 7
With this realization of the actual content of due process, the apparent
conflict of the decision of the Court in the instant case with prior holdings
1. Section 303 (b) of the Revenue Act of 1924, 43 STAT. 306 (1924), 26
U. S. C. § 1095b (1926), provides in part that the value of the net estate of
a non-resident shall be determined "by deducting from the value of that part
of his gross estate which ...is situated in the United States .. ." certain
specified deductions (italics supplied). The provision is the same in prior and
subsequent acts. See note 12, in fra.
2. Burnet v. Brooks, 53 Sup. Ct. 457 (March 13, 1933).
3. See note 6, infra.
4. For an exhaustive discussion of the cases illustrating this point, see
Rottschaeffer, State Jurisdiction to Impose Taxes (1933) 42 YALE L. J. 305.
5. Blackstone v. Miller, 188 U. S. 189 (1903).
6. Blackstone v. Miller, 188 U. S. 189 (1903), was overruled in Farmers'
Loan and Trust Co. v. Minnesota, 280 U. S. 204 (1930), in which case the state
of the obligor's domicile was held without power to impose an estate tax on
bonds owned by a non-resident and physically present in the state of his
domicile. The same result was reached in Baldwin v. Missouri, 281 U. S.
586 (1930), where the intangibles were physically present in the state at-
tempting to tax. See also Beidler v. South Carolina, 282 U. S. 1 (1930).
'7. See dissenting opinions by Mr. Justice Holmes in Farmers' Loan and
Trust Co. v. Minnesota, 280 U. S. 204, 216 (1930); Baldwin v. Missouri, 281
U. S. 586, 595 (1930), and by Mr. Justice Stone in Baldwin v. Missouri, 281
U. S. 586, 596 (1930); First National Bank of Boston v. Maine, 284 U. S.
312, 331 (1932).
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concerning the constitutionality of state taxes under the Fourteenth Amend-
ment becomes more reconcilable. The Supreme Court, in deciding upon the
constitutionality of a state tax, is in a position to define due process in the
light of the general welfare of all the states as a whole. And since it is
thought that double taxation is destructive of uniformity and harmony, due
process is said to permit only the domiciliary state to tax. But when the
Supreme Court considers the validity of a federal tax on aliens, it is unable
to approach the problem with an international solution as an objective, for
its decision will be binding only upon this country. Due process, therefore,
becomes that which serves the best interests of the United States in view of
the position other nations have adopted. Thus, it is quite understandable
that the Court should have found its most persuasive authority for the pro-
position that the tax under consideration did not contravene the Fifth Amend-
ment in a decision by the House of Lords upholding a precisely similar tax
levied by England upon a citizen of the United States.8 Precedent, moreover,
existed for distinguishing between jurisdiction for the purposes of state and
jurisdiction for the purposes of federal taxation. Although a domiciliary
state may not tax tangible personalty permanently located in another state,0
a federal tax on the use of foreign built yachts by citizens of the United States
has been considered applicable to a yacht which never came within the terri-
torial waters of the United States.' 0
The Court's interpretation of the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment as forbidding double taxation of intangibles has functioned to produce
a freer capital market within the United States." It is possible that the
reversal of position in the principal case in respect to international taxation
will have the opposite effect of diverting investments from this country. To
escape the federal estate tax on foreign and domestic bonds aid foreign stocks,
non-resident aliens will remove the securities now physically present here to
the domiciliary countries. The income earned by the securities, instead of
being collected and used in this country, will be remitted to the domicile and
seek investmen't in other markets. Furthermore, domestic stocks will find
almost no market in foreign countries, since by the express provisions of the
Revenue Act these securities are subject to an estate tax regardless of their
physical situs.12 Nevertheless, the decision is fully justified as an assurance
8. Winans v. Attorney-General, (1910) A. C. 27.
9. Frick v. Pennsylvania, 268 U. S. 473 (1924).
10. United States v. Bennett, 232 U. S. 299 (1914).
11. See Rottschaeffer, supra note 4.
12. Section 303(d) of the Revenue Act of 1924, 43 STAT. 307 (1924), 26
U. S. C. § 1095d (1926), provides that stock in a domestic corporation shall
be deemed "property within the United States." The Board of Tax Appeals,
in Burnet v. Brooks, 22 B. T. A. 71 (1931), held that the securities involved
in the instant case were not meant to be taxed under the Revenue Act of 1924,
reasoning that Section 303(d), supra, implies that securities other than stock
in a domestic corporation are not to be regarded as "property within the
United States." The Circuit Court of Appeals, in Burnet v. Brooks, 60 F.
(2d) 890 (0. C. A. 2d, 1932), affirmed the Board's decision in reliance on the
negative implication of Section 303(d). In First National Bank of Boston
v. Maine, 284 U. S. 312 (1932), an estate tax by the state of a corporation's
domicile on stock of the corporation owned by a non-resident was declared
invalid.
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to the United States of a tactical position in the movement to eliminate inter-
national double taxation, which has assumed increasing proportions since the
World War.13 In a draft convention presented to the League of Nations,F1
a proposal was made that the domiciliary country should deduct from its
succession tax on "immovable property, furniture and fittings belonging thereto"
the amount of duty payable in the country in which the assets are situated.S
Because of the difficulty presented by "varying legal conceptions," no conclu-
sion was reached as to which country should be permitted to tan testamentary
transfers of intangibles.' 0 The solution to this problem was thought to lie in
reciprocal arrangements between the countries.' 7 A contrary holding in the
principal case, therefore, would have resulted in a self-imposed restriction
placing the United States in an undesirable bargaining position to secure
protection for its own citizens in future agreements with other countries.
CONSTRUCTION OF DErD ALLEGEM TO CRaE..TE DEFEASIBLE ESTATE
Coi ussioNERs were appointed by an act of the Missouri legislature in 1822 to
receive proposals for a donation of land to be used as a county court house, to
select a site, to accept the gift, and to cause a conveyance to be executed to
the justices of the county court and their successors in office forever in trust
for the use of the county. X and Y granted the land forever in trust for the
use of the county "but upon this condition nevertheless that the said piece of
ground shall be used and appropriated forever as the site on which the court
house . . . shall be erected." A court house was built and used as such
until 1930, when the courts were moved to a new building. The heirs of X
instituted suit, claiming an interest in the land on the ground that either a
determinable fee or an estate upon condition subsequent had been created by
the original grant. It was admitted by counsel for both parties that any trust
created by the deed was a dry trust executed by the statute of uscs. It was alco
agreed that the conveyance was not a dedication of the land for a public use.
The court held that the intention of the grantor was not to convey either a
determinable or a conditional fee and that the heirs of the grantors had no
interest in the property.'
A determinable fee simple is an estate created with a special limitation which
delimits the duration of an interest in land 2 and is usually established by
13. See HERNDON, RELIEF FROm INTERNATIONAL INcoMu TAXATION (193-);
Taxation of Foreign and National Enterprises, League of Nations, Geneva
(1932).
14. Report presented by the General Meeting of Government Experts on
Double Taxation and Tax Evasion to the League of Nations, Geneva (102S).
15. Or "The actual amount of duty levied by the country of domicile on
assets situated in another country," whichever is lower. Id. at 22.
16. See Carroll, Double Taxation Relicf (1927) Trade Information Bulletin
No. 523.
17. See Report, supra note 14, at 22.
1. Chouteau v. City of St. Louis, 55 S. W. (2d) 299 (Mo. 1932).
2. PRoPERTY RESTATElmNT (Am. L. Inst. 1929) § 22; Note (1925) 34 Y=x
L. J. 444; Note (1930) 28 MICH. L. RV. 1015.
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the use of appropriate words such as "so long as," "until," or "during," 8 where
these words are shown to be a part of the grant itself.4 The argument ad-
vanced by some that after the statute of Quia Emptores, abolishing tenure, a
determinable fee could not exist 5 has recently been shown to be erroneous in
theory, and the American courts have long recognized such estates.0 In the
instant case the court decided that no determinable fee was created because
appropriate words were not used and because the clause under consideration
did not form a part of, but was superadded to, the original grant. The
interest, if any, of the heirs, therefore, was at most a power of termination1
after breach of condition subsequent.
Courts have frequently held that provisions analogous to those in the prin-
cipal case were inserted in deeds merely to show the purpose for which the
grantor intended the property to be used.8 In other cases, similar clauses
have been considered as creating a trust rather than a conditional estate, with
the result that they might be enforced by a court of equity but that a broach
thereof would not give a power of termination to the heirs of the grantor.0
Still other courts have construed such provisions as creating a covenant, breach
of which, though it might give rise to an action for damages, would not affect
the title.' 0 But even if it be conceded that the grant in the instant case
created a fee upon condition subsequent, it might be argued that inasmuch as
the land had been used for the purpose specified for over a century there had
been a sufficient compliance with the terms of the grant to render a breach of
the condition immaterial." Again, it is probable, as the court indicated, that
3. See note 2, supra, and note 6, infra; Jamaica Aqueduct Corp. v. Chandler,
91 Mass. 159 (1864); First Universalist Society of North Adams v. Boland, 155
Mass. 171, 29 N. E. 524 (1892); Pond v. Douglas, 106 Me. 85, 75 Atl. 320 (1909);
Sperry v. Pond, 5 Ohio 387 (1832).
4. 1 TIFFANY, REAL PROPERTY (2d ed. 1920) § 90.
5. GRAY, RULE AGAINST PERPETUITIES (3d ed. 1915) §§ 31-42; Zane, Doternin-
able Fees (1904) 17 HARv. L. REv. 297.
6. Powell, Determinable Fees (1923) 23 COL. L. Rnv. 207; Vance, Rights of
Reverter (1927) 36 YAIE L. J. 593; 1 TIFFANY, op. cit. supra note 4, §§ 93
et seq.
7. The phrase "power of termination" is used in preference to "right of
re-entry" because the heir has not a right but a power and under modern law
the estate may usually be terminated in other ways than by a re-entry.
PROPERTY RESTATEMENT, op. cit. supra note 2, §§ 24, 27.
8. First Presbyterian Church v. Bailey, 11 Del. Ch. 116, 97 Atl. 583 (1916);
Downen v. Rayburn, 214 Ill. 342, 73 N. E. 364 (1905); Episcopal City Mission
v. Appleton, 117 Mass. 326 (1875); Greene v. O'Connor, 18 R. I. 56, 25 At].
692 (1892).
9. Stanley v. Colt, 72 U. S. 119 (1866); Bristol Baptist Church v. Connecti-
cut Baptist Convention, 98 Conn. 677, 120 Ath 497 (1923); South Kingston v.
Wakefield Trust Co., 48 R. I. 27, 134 At]. 815 (1926); Gabert v. Olcott, 86
Tex. 121, 23 S. W. 985 (1893).
10. Columbia Ry. v. South Carolina, 261 U. S. 236 (1923); Hawley v.
Kafitz, 148 Cal. 393, 83 Pac. 248 (1905); Curtis v. Board of Education, 43
Kan. 138, 23 Pac. 98 (1890); Chicago, Texas, and Mexican Central Ry. Co.
v. Titterington, 84 Tex. 218, 19 S. W. 472 (1892).
11. Mead v. Ballard, 74 U. S. 290 (1868); Hunt v. Beeson, 18 Ind. 380
(1862); Sumner v. Darnell, 128 Ind. 38, 27 N. E. 162 (1890).
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the intention of the grantor was merely to make the deed conform to the terms
of the legislative enactment giving the commissioners the power to accept the
land for the county.' 2 And finally, the absence here of a clause providing for
a power of termination in case of a breach of the condition indicates a lack of
intention on the part of the grantor to create a conditional fee.13
On the other hand, it should be noted that in the principal case the words
used in the qualifying clause, "upon this condition," have frequently been said
to be peculiarly appropriate to the creation of a condition subsequent1 4 and
to require enforcement as such. Ample support, therefore, might be found for
a decision in accord with either plaintiffs' or defendants' contentions; and if
the alleged breach of the condition had occurred within a comparatively short
time after the execution of the deed,1' the court would have been fully justified
in declaring the defendants' interest to be forfeited. But since the creation of
the grant preceded the institution of suit by more than a century, the court's
conclusion in the instant case is probably the more desirable. It obviates any
difficulties attendant upon locating the heirs 10 and avoids a restraint upon
the free alienation of the land.17
POWER OF A SURETY COMPANY TO LI ir ITS LIABILrry ON A DEPOSITARY BOND
A suRT company executed a bond to the state of Pennsylvania stipulating
that a bank would keep all moneys of the commonwealth deposited with it and
would repay the full sum when and as requested by the state. By the terms
of the bond the surety company held itself "bound as principal" and agreed
to answer for the bank's debt "whether the said First National Banh be first
pursued or not." Eight years later, the company served notice upon the proper
officials of the state to collect all deposits secured by the bond within thirty
days, and declared that if the notice were not complied with, its liability would
cease at that time. The state took no action under the notice. Subsequently
the bank failed and the state brought suit against the surety company. 1
12. Cf. Stuart v. Easton, 170 U. S. 383 (1898); Wright v. Morgan, 191
U. S. 55 (1903); Harris v. Shaw, 13 Ill. 456 (1851); Kerlin v. Campbell, 15
Pa. 500 (1850); see Mo. Laws (1822) c. 40.
13. Cf. Garfield Township v. Herman, 66 Kan. 256, 71 Pac. 517 (1903);
Rawson v. Inhabitants of School District, 89 Mass. 125, 131 (1863); Haydon
v. St. Louis & San Francisco Rr. Co., 222 Mo. 126, 121 S. W. 15 (1909).
14. PROPERTY RESTATEMiENT, op. cit. supra note 2, § 24; 1 TiFFA1Py, op. cit.
supra note 4, § 78; 3 THOMPSON, REAL PROPERTY (1924) § 1962; see Mead v.
Ballard, 74 U. S. 290 (1868); cf. Trustees of General Assembly of Presbyterian
Church v. Alexander, 46 S. W. 503 (Ky. 1898); Second Universalist Society
v. Dugan, 65 Md. 460, 5 Atl. 415 (1886); Gaskins v. Williams, 235 Mo. 563,
139 S. W. 117 (1911).
15. Cf. Daniels v. Wilson, 27 Wis. 492 (1871); Pepin County v. Prindle,
61 Wis. 301, 21 N. W. 254 (1884).
16. Cf. Sapper v. Mathers, 286 Pa. 364, 133 Atl. 565 (1926).
17. If the use had resulted in actual benefit to the grantors individually, a
different result might have been reached. Homer v. Chicago, Milwaukee, &
St. Paul Ry. Co., 38 Wis. 165 (1875); see Downen v. Rayburn, supra note 8;
Rawson v. Inhabitants of School District, supra note 13, at 129.
1. Commonwealth v. National Surety Co., 164 AtI. 788 (Pa. 1932).
In most states, contrary to the prevailing view 'at common law,2 it is pro-
vided by statute that when a creditor's claim has matured, a surety may
limit the duration of its liability by serving notice upon the creditor to proceed
against the debtor within a reasonable time.3 In Pennsylvania, however,
even at common law a surety had power to limit its liability in this way,4
and the statute merely provides that the surety "shall not be discharged . . .
unless such notice shall be in writing and signed by the party giving the
same." 5 Since this statute limits rather than enlarges the surety's power,
there still remains open the question of the circumstances under which a
surety may thus be released. In the instant case the court held that the
surety, by binding itself as principal, had waived its power to compel the
state to demand payment from the bank and consequently remained liable
to the state despite the notice. A concurring opinion argued further that
although bonds executed by surety companies for a consideration are in form
contracts of suretyship, they are in all essentials contracts of insurance and
should be subject to the same rules of construction and interpretation.0 Except
as provided in the policy an insurer may not cancel the contract without the
insured's consent,7 and where there is a beneficiary with a vested interest,
his consent also must be obtained.8 The commonwealth in this case had such
an interest in the bond from the date of its execution, and there was no
provision permitting the surety to limit its liability. If the bond is looked
upon as a contract of insurance, therefore, the surety company should not be
allowed to release itself without the state's consent.
2. Lawyers' Surety Co. v. Ayrault, 165 App. Div. 254, 150 N. Y. Supp.
800 (1914); Harris v. Newell, 42 Wis. 687 (1877). Contra: Cope v. Smith,
8 S. & R. 110 (Pa. 1822); cf. Pain v. Packard, 13 Johns, 174 (N. Y. 1816). I-low-
ever, the surety could in equity compel the debtor to make payment. Taylor
v. Beck, 13 Ill. 376 (1851).
3. Notice to proceed on a debt is permitted, "after a right of action has
accrued thereon." Mo. STAT. ANN. (1932) § 2931; OHIO GEN. CODE (Page,
1926) § 12191; TENN. CODE (1932) § 7526. A notice given before maturity
of the claim has no legal operation. Scales v. Cox, 106 Ind. 261, 6 N. E. 622
(1886). Since a bank is under no duty to repay a depositor until actual
demand is made, Phelps v. Bostwick, 22 Barb. 314 (N. Y. 1856); N. Joachimson
v. Swiss Bank, (1921) 3 K. B. 110; and since the state had made no demand,
no right of action had accrued prior to the giving of notice. It might be argued
that this circumstance is sufficient to except the case from the operation of
the statute. The court did not consider the question, however, apparently
assuming that a deposit is due at all times.
4. Cope v. Smith, supra note 2.
5. PA. STAT. ANN. (Purdon, 1930) tit. 8, § 21.
6. Gee. A. Hormel and Co. v. American Bonding Co., 112 Minn. 288, 128
N. W. 12 (1910), annotated fully in (1911) 33 L. R. A. (N.S.) 513; Young
v. American Bonding Co., 228 Pa. 373, '77 Atl. 623 (1910); Piedmont Guano
and Mfg. Co. v. Morris, 86 Va. 941, 11 S. E. 883 (1890) (guaranty and surety-
ship distinguished).
7. Artificial Ice Co. v. Reciprocal Exchange, 192 Iowa 1133, 184 N. W. 756
(1921); Levan v. Pottstown, Phoenixville Ry. Co., 279 Pa. 381, 124 At. 89
(1924).
8. Brown v. Farmer's State Bank, 70 Ind. App. 182, 123 1T. E. 224 (1919);
Coleman v. Northwestern Insurance Co., 273 Mo. 620, 201 S. W. 544 (1917).
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Moreover, even if the clause binding the surety as principal were not in
itself deemed sufficient ground for the decision, considerations of policy and
of the probable intent of the parties would justify the court in excepting the
surety company in this case from the operation of the statute.o At the time
the notice was served upon the state, the bank was apparently weak. If a
run could be avoided the bank might have been able to strengthen its position,
but a demand by the state for its entire deposit would probably have pre-
cipitated a run and might even have forced the bank into immediate insolvency.
If, therefore, the surety company had succeeded in compelling the state to
withdraw its funds, the bank and its other customers would have been seri-
ously injured; the state would have gained nothing, for its deposit was in-
sured; and only the surety company would have derived a benefit. Unless
this result was clearly intended by the parties, the public interest would seem
sufficient to forbid it. But the very purpose of the depositary bond, and the
consideration for which the bank paid the surety its premiums, was to indemnify
the state in the event of the bank's insolvency. Had the bank and the surety
company, in executing the bond, intended that the surety could forestall the
contingency by anticipating the bank's insolvency and compelling the state
to withdraw its funds, a power so detrimental to the bank would surely have
been stipulated in terms. In the absence of such express provision the power
should not be implied.' 0
EXECUTION OF REPLEVIN JUDGMENT IN THE ALTERNATIVE FOR Possqmsi0z
OF CHATTEL OR ITS VALUE
AN insurance broker contracted with the lessee of a building to install in it
a sprinkler system. The system, which was to remain affixed to the building
for the balance of the lessee's term, was to be considered personal property
and title to it was to remain in the broker. A new lessee later took possession
-6f the building with notice of the broker's title to the sprinlder system, but
refused to surrender the chattel to him. The broker thereupon brought an
action of replevin, and obtained a judgment awarding him damage,- and a
right to possession of the chattel, or, as an alternative if possession could not
be secured, the value of the chattel as installed in the building. The New
York Court of Appeals in reversing this judgment held that as an alternative
to possession the plaintiff was entitled only to the value of the sprinkler
system after removal from the building. To avoid the profit that such a
measure of value would give to the defendant if he were to retain the chattel,
the court declared that a replevin judgment can be satisfied by payment of
9. Cf. Cedar County v. Johnson, 50 Mo. 225 (1872); Johnson County v.
Gilkeson, 70 Mo. 645 (1879). But see M1anitowe County v. Truman, 91 Wis.
1, 14, 64 N. W. 307, 310 (1895).
10. If the notice had been treated as an anticipatory repudiation, the court
would have been justified in holding that the state did not act unreasonably
in failing to withdraw the deposit in view of the surrounding circumstances.
The damages, therefore, would still be the full amount of the loss. O'Neil
v. Supreme Council American Legion of Honor, 70 N. J. Law 410, 57 At.
463 (1904).
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the chattel's value only when the chattel itself has been removed from the
jurisdiction or is otherwise unavailable. 1
When a money recovery is sought for the loss of a chattel which has a higher
value to the plaintiff than to the defendant, the well-established rule that the
plaintiff is entitled to the value of the property to him 2 seems fair and rea-
sonable. When, however, a defendant has acquired possession of promises
with notice that plaintiff owns a fixture upon them and is entitled to remove
it, a different question arises. In such circumstances a judgment for plaintiff
measuring the chattel's value by its worth to the plaintiff would enable the
defendant to profit from the transaction, for it would permit him to retain
and use the chattel at a cost less than its value to him. Since the defendant
presumably is the wrong-doer, such a result seems inequitable. On the other
hand a similar judgment awarding the plaintiff the value of the chattel to
the defendant would give a profit to the plaintiff, since it would allow him
a sum larger than h4 could realize by selling the chattel in the condition in
which he is entitled to it. While neither party has a legal right to the profit
which the court in these circumstances must apparently allocate to one or
the other of them, the claim of the plaintiff seems less inequitable than that
of the defendant. The court in the principal case, however, reached a con-
trary conclusion,3 apparently basing its decision upon the theory that the law
seeks merely to compensate a plaintiff for his loss. 4 This decision has the
somewhat startling implication that the law will permit a person to seize
property which has a greater value to him than to its owner, and to retain
it on payment of whatever lesser value the chattel has to the person losing it.
To avoid giving the defendant such an advantage the court attempted to
make of the replevin action a strictly possessory remedy, holding that in such
an action neither party can resort to the alternative judgment for the chattel's
value if the chattel itself is available. In its effort to deprive the defendant
of the privilege of electing to retain the chattel,5 the ,court thus at the same
1. I. Tanenbaum Son & Co. v. C. Ludwig Baumann & Co., 261 N. Y. 85,
184 N. E. 503 (1933).
2. Thus where the plaintiff's right is to the possession of the chattel at-
tached to property, and the fact of its attachment increases the chattel's value,
the plaintiff may recover the larger value. Starkey v. Kelly, 50 N. Y. 676
(1872); Blake-McFall Co. v. Wilson, 98 Ore. 626, 193 Pac. 902 (1920);
Thompson v. Pettitt, 10 Q. B. 101 (1847). But of. Pennybecker v. McDougal,
48 Cal. 160 (1874). Where the difference in value arises from a personal or
sentimental interest in the chattel, there being no market value for it, plaintiff
may recover the value of the goods to him. Iler v. Baker, 82 Mich. 226,
46 N. W. 377 (1890); Swank v. Elwert, 55 Ore. 487, 105 Pac. 901 (1910).
3. Other courts have reached the same decision. Gosliner v. Briones, 187
Cal. 557, 204 Pac. 19 (1921); Walker v. Schindel, 58 Md. 360 (1882); Mooro
v. Wood, 12 Abb. Prac. 393 (N. Y. 1860); Johnston v. The Albany Dry Goods
Co., 12 App. Div. 608, 43 N. Y. Supp. 164 (3d Dep't 1897). But of. Smyth v.
Stoddard, 203 Ill. 424, 67 N. E. 980 (1903).
4. Demogue, Validity of the Theory of Compensatory Damages (1918) 27
YAL L. J. 585.
. 5. Other courts have found a similar restriction desirable. Black v. Hilliker,
130 Cal. 190, 62 Pac. 481 (1900); Ladd v. Stratton, 122 Kan. 274, 252 Pac. 234
(1927); Koelling v. August Gast Bank Note & Lithographing Co., 103 Mo.
App. 98, 77 S. W. 474 (1903); Lembeck & Betz Brewing Co. v. Tarrant, 79 N. J.
L. 372, 75 Atl. 474 (1910); General Motors Acceptance Corp. v. American
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time placed a similar restriction upon the plaintiff.0 The harshness of this
restriction will be avoided if the trial court in its discretion permits a plaintiff
by amendment to change his form of action after verdict or even after judg-
ment 7 to one entitling him to recover the chattel's value as found by thejury.8 But unless such an amendment is allowed, the court's restriction upon
the replevin action will require a plaintiff to elect whether to seek his chattel
or its value before he knows what value the law will attribute to it and
before he knows when or under what circumstances his judgment may be
executed.9 Other jurisdictions avoid placing the plaintiff at this disadvantage
by providing that in such an action he may execute an alternative judgment
in his favor for either the return of the chattel or for its value.10 The broader
Surety Co. of New York, 108 N. J. L. 229, 157 Atl. 98 (1931). But cf.
Lundlade v. Pierce, 95 Cal. App. 192, 272 Pac. 329 (1928).
6. The New York Court has held in previous cases that the plaintiff should
have no option in enforcing his judgment. Dwight v. Enos and Janes, 9 N. Y.
470 (1854); Fitzhugh v. Wiman, 9 N. Y. 559 (1854); but there was no question
in these cases of a different value to the different parties, or of the expense
of detaching the chattel from a building.
7. The supreme court in its discretion may set aside or vacate judgments
and permit pleadings to be served, in furtherance of the ends of justice. Van-
derbilt v. Schreyer, 81 N. Y. 646, 648 (1880). Plaintiffs have been allowed
to amend after judgment to set forth a new cause of action even though thejudgment had previously been satisfied, Hatch v. The Central National Bank,
78 N. Y. 487 (1879), and to allow interested parties who had not appeared
to enter a defense. Vanderbilt v. Schreyer, szipra; Ladd v. Stevenson, 112
N. Y. 325, 19 N. E. 842 (1889). But the plaintiff must show that refusal
to vacate and amend will result in sufficient injustice to warrant a proceeding
directly opposed to the usual rule of rcs judicata.
8. The primary object of the replevin action is the return of the property.
An action of conversion or assumpsit would lie for the value of the chattel
as of the time of the conversion. 2 SEDwicx ON DAxAGES (9th ed. 1912)
§§ 492, 497. That such an action would lie in the principal case, cf. Gosliner
v. Briones; Walker v. Schindel; Moore v. Wood; and Johnston v. The Albany
Dry Goods Co., all supra note 3.
9. After a final judgment, appeal may substantially delay the enforcement
of the plaintiff's legal rights. Until a judgment is issued and the time for
taking an appeal passed, there is little certainty or security in holding the
judgment, since obsolescence of the chattel or insolvency of the plaintiff may
present issues which were not foreseen but which would make a change of
remedy desirable.
10. § 1124 of the NEw YORK CrvI PRACTICE ACT requires that a replevin
judgment award possession, or in the event possession cannot be had, the
chattel's value as of the time of trial. Similar statutes are found in many
states. Cf. ARK. DIG. STAT. (Crawford & Moses, 1921) § 8654; COLO. A2Nir.
STAT. (Mills, 1930) § 4399; KAN. REv. STAT. ANN. (1923) c. 60, § 1010;
N. C. Com. LAws ANN. (1913) § 7682; ORE. CODE ANN. (1930) c. 2, § 1503;
W. V.- CODE (1931) c. 55, art. 6, § 6. In some states provisions for an alterna-
tive judgment are accompanied with a further provision that the plaintiff shall
have the option to enforce an alternative judgment for either the return of
the property or the money value. Aniz. CODE (Strucklneyer, 1928) § 4352;
IowA CODE (1931) § 12195; Ky. STAT. (Carroll, 1930) § 1605; MICH. Comn.
remedy thus provided gives the plaintiff more adequate relief 'without placing the
defendant under any liability not already incurred.
ALLOCATION OF LOSS FOR TAX PURPOSES WHEN BUILDING IS
DEMOLISHED UNDER TERMS OF LEASE
RECENT Revenue Acts 1 provide that in computing net income there shall be
allowed as deductions losses sustained during the taxable year and "not com-
pensated for by insurance or otherwise." In interpreting this provision the
District of Columbia Court of Appeals has recently held that a property
owner who leased land with the stipulation that the lessee demolish the exist-
ing building and erect a new structure to revert to the lessor on the expiration
of the lease, may not deduct the value of the old building from his not income
for the year in which it was demolished, but must amortize the loss over the
period of the lease.2
Objection to the decision may be raised on the ground that small property
owners do not keep their accounts in such form as to provide for long-term
amortization. Moreover, it is possible, as the complainant contended in the
principal case, that the lessor did not consider the value of the demolished
building in determining the rental under the new lease, but viewed the demo-
lition as a loss. Nevertheless, the court's ruling appears sound. The property
owner did not sustain a loss for which he was not compensated "by insurance
or otherwise"; on the contrary, he secured a long-term lease, the rent thereon,
a new building constructed at no cost to himself, and prospective title to the
new building at the expiration of the lease. The value of the demolished
structure may thus be considered one of his expenses in securing the new
lease, similar to other costs involved in the lease negotiations. It was part
of the lessor's investment and, as a capital expenditure, should be amortized
over the full lease period rather than deducted all in one year.
This reasoning is in accord with previous holdings of the federal courts
and of the United States Board of Tax Appeals. In a similar case 3 a Circuit
Court of Appeals held that if the lessors added to their assets or if they sub-
stituted real property for another form of capital assets, the cost of working
out the change should be classified as a contribution to assets and should not
be immediately deducted as an expense charged against the income account.
In that case the court emphasized a section in the Revenue Act of 1924 'which
provided that no deduction should be made for "any amount paid out for
LAws (1929) §§ 14840, 14844; Mo. REv. STAT. (1929) § 2565; PA. STAT. ANN.
(Purdon, 1930) tit. 12, § 1836.
1. Revenue Act of 1921, 42 STAT. 240, 255; Revenue Act of 1932, § 23 (e, f).
2. Spinks Realty Co. v. Burnet, 62 F. (2d) 860 (App. D. C. 1932).
3. Young v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 59 F. (2d) 691 (C. C. A.
9th, 1932). Cf. Anahma Realty Corp. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue,
42 F. (2d) 128 (C. C. A. 2d, 1930); Manning v. Commissioner of Internal
Revenue, 7 B. T. A. 286 (1927); Ward v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue,
7 B. T. A. 1107 (1927); Pig & Whistle Co. v. Commissioner of Internal ReVe.
nue, 9 B. T. A. 668 (1927); Eysenbach v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue,
10 B. T. A. 716 (1928).
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new buildings or for permanent improvements or betterments made to increase
the value of any property or estate." 4
Approved accounting methods also support the decision in the principal case.
The cost of permanent assets, serving a productive use for a period of years,
is usually spread as an expense over the period of use.G And in this con-
nection it is proper to consider not the year, but the entire period of produc-
tion as the fiscal unit of time.0 Furthermore, the cost of a building, for
accounting purposes, should include the necessary incidental expenses such as
the removal of a previous building occupying the site; 7 and thd cost of
demolishing a building for the purpose of reconstruction is regarded as a
capital investment in the new structure.8 By similar analysis the costs in-
volved in securing a new lease, including the value of a building demolished
to make room for a new structure provided for in the lease, are part of the
cost of acquiring a fixed asset and should be amortized over the life of that
asset.
APPLICABILITY OF SuBsTITuTED SERVICE OF PROCESS STATUTs,
To FEDERAL CORPORATIONS
THE Federal Land Bank of Columbia, South Carolina, was organized to serve
and is doing business in Florida, Georgia, and North and South Carolina. 1
Suit was instituted against it in North Carolina and service of process was
attempted under a statute providing that "every corporation having property
or doing business in this state, whether incorporated under its laws or not,"
must submit to substituted service upon the secretary of state if it does not
have a local agent upon whom process can be served.2  The Supreme Court
of North Carolina held that the statute is applicable only to foreign corpora-
tions doing business in North Carolina by the comity of the state; that the
Federal Land Bank, since it derives its right to do business solely from
Congress, is not a foreign corporation within the power of the state to exclude;
and that therefore the provisions of the act are not applicable to it.3
The fact that the Federal Land Bank is a federal corporation cannot be
used to secure federal jurisdiction, because the required 50% of its stocli is
not owned by the federal government. 4 Moreover, the present decision that
4. Revenue Act of 1924, 43 STAT. 271, 26 U. S. C. § 956 (a) (2) (1926).
This provision also appears in the Revenue Act of 1921, 42 STAT. 242, and in
the Revenue Act of 1932, § 24 (a) (2).
5. HIATFIELD, ACCOUNTING (1928) 131.
6. Id. at 133-4.
7. Id. at 85.
8. 1 MONTGOMERY, AUDITING THEORY AND PRACTICE (1922) 645.
1. 39 STAT. 360 (1916), 12 U. S. C. § 641 (192); MOODY'S BNus &
FINANCE (1932) 1980.
2. N. C. CODE ANN. (Michie, 1931) § 1137.
3. Leggett v. Federal Land Bank of Columbia, S. C., 204 N. C. 151, 167 S. E.
557 (1983).
4. 43 STAT. 941 (1925), 28 U. S. C. § 42 (1926).
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service of process cannot be secured in North Carolina precludes suit against
it in the federal courts of that state on the ground of diversity of citizenshilp.5
All actions against the Federal Land Bank arising in North Carolina, there-
fore, must now be brought in South Carolina where its office is located and
where service on its officials can be secured, unless it consents to service else-
where.
Most of the other states have similar statutes stipulating for substituted
service, and it is true that they were originally upheld on the ground that the
power of a state to exclude a foreign corporation includes the power to impose
upon it reasonable regulations and requirements.6 But many courts, contrary
to the present decision, have not found it necessary to follow the negative of
the proposition and to hold that whenever the state cannot exclude, it cannot
prescribe for substituted service.7 To meet the lack of any real consent and
to avoid the necessity of resorting to a fiction, it has been said that jurisdiction
may be based upon the mere presence of the corporation within the state. 8
And one federal court 9 has recommended that if a foreign corporation volun-
tarily does business within the state it should be bound by the reasonable
regulations of that state on the ground that it has impliedly consented to
them.10 The limitations imposed by the courts are that the method of service
5. See Federal Conformity Act, 43 STAT. 1264 (1925), 28 U. S. C. § 112
(1926).
6. Lafayette Insurance Co. v. French, 18 How. 404 (U. S. 1855), is the
leading case on this doctrine. See HENDERSON, PosITION or FOREIGN ConPoRA-
TIONS IN AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (1918) 77; Cahill, Jurisdiotion over
Foreign Corporations and Individuals who Carry on Business Within the Ter-
ritory (1917) 30 HARV. L. REv. 676; Scott, Jurisdiction over Nonresidents
Doing Business Within a State (1919) 32 HARV. L. REv. 871.
7. See Cahill, supra note 6.
8. Barrow Steamship Co. v. Kane, 170 U. S. 100 (1898); International
Harvester Co. v. Kentucky, 234 U. S. 579 (1914); Louisville & Nashville Rr.
Co. v. Chatters, 279 U. S. 320 (1929); Erikson v. Frink Co., Inc., 16 F. (2d)
498 (D. Mass. 1926); Tauza v. Susquehanna Coal Co., 220 N. Y. 259, 115
N. E. 915 (1917).
9. Smolik v. Philadelphia & Reading Coal & Iron Co., 222 Fed, 148 (S. D.
N. Y. 1915).
10. A state cannot exclude a corporation engaged only in interstate com-
merce, yet in some states statutes have been sustained providing that such
corporations must appoint an agent for process, and thus be brought within
the jurisdiction of the state. International Harvester Co. v. Kentucky, supra
note 8. Compare also statutes providing for securing judgments against
partnership assets when some of the partners are non-residents and service
of process upon them cannot be obtained. Sugg v. Thornton, 132 U. S. 524
(1889). The judgment in such cases, however, is good only against the part-
nership assets, and not against the individual assets of a partner outside the
state. In Flexner v. Farson, 268 Ill. 435, 109 N. E. 327 (1915), the Illinois
court regarded as unconstitutional a Kentucky statute providing that all
foreign partnerships, unincorporated associations and individuals doing business
within the state must submit to constructive service upon their agents. This
same statute had been upheld by the Kentucky court in Guenther v. American
Steel Hoop Co., 116 Ky. 580, 76 S. W. 419 (1903). For arguments that the
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should be reasonable and one in which due notice is given,1 ' and that the
requirements of the statute should not place any greater burden upon the
non-resident than is placed upon the residents of the state.'2
In the instant case it was not said that North Carolina may not for any
purposes classify the Federal Land Bank as a foreign corporation, but the
opinion indicates that the court found dificulty in so conceiving it. No case
involving an interpretation of a service of process statute has been found in
which there was discussed the question of whether a given state should con-
sider a federal corporation foreign or domestic. And the problem has not
been raised in any circumstances as to Federal Land Banks. However, in
the application of statutes providing for levying attachment against foreign
corporations, 13 statutes regulating the giving of security for costs in law
suits,14 pleading statutes,' 5 and taxation statutes,16 the New York courts have
followed the rule that a national bank17 is domestic to the state in which it
is located and foreign to all other states.18 Federally incorporated railroads
and insurance companies have also been classified as foreign corporations,'
0
although Pennsylvania has decided that a federally incorporated railroad is
not foreign to Pennsylvania.20 In the instant case, therefore, the court would
have been fully justified in holding that the Federal Land Bank should be
considered a foreign corporation doing business in North Carolina, and in
applying to it the statutory requirements for substituted service of process.
Federal Land Banks, Federal Intermediate Credit Banks, the Reconstruc-
tion Finance Corporation and other federal corporations are at present carry-
ing on a large amount of business throughout the entire country, and the
present legislative tendency is to increase both their number and their activi-
ties. The most satisfactory solution of the jurisdictional problems involved
would clearly be for Congress, in the incorporating acts, to state definitely
its intent as to the jurisdiction in which the corporations are to sue and be
sued, and the extent of state control to be permitted. But in the absence of
reasoning in the Guenther case rather than that in the Flcxncr case should
be followed, see Cahill; Scott, both supra note 6.
11. Wuchter v. Pizzutti, 276 U. S. 13 (1928).
12. Moredock v. Kirby, 118 Fed. 180 (C. C. W. D. Ky. 1902).
13. Bowen v. First National Bank of Medina, 34 How. Pr. 408 (N. Y. 1867).
14. National Park Bank v. Gunst, 1 Abb. New Cases 292 (N. Y. 1876);
Beckham v. Hague, 44 App. Div. 146, 60 N. Y. Supp. 767 (1899).
15. First National Bank of Northampton v. Doying, 13 Daly 509, 11 N. Y.
Civ. Pr. 61 (1886).
16. Cooke v. State National Bank of Boston, 3 Abb. Pr. (N. S.) 339, 50
Barb. 339 (N. Y. 1867); In re Cushing's Estate, 40 Misc. 505, 82 N. Y. Supp.
795 (Sur. Ct. 1903).
17. The National Banking Act provides that the national banks are to sue
and be sued in the state and federal courts where the banks are located. 18
STAT. 320 (1875), 12 U. S. C. § 94 (1926).
18. See cases cited notes 13, 14, 15 and 16, supra.
19. Daly v. The National Life Insurance Co. of the U. S. A., 64 Ind. 1
(1878); Caledonian Coal Co. v. Baker, Justice, 12 N. M. 456, 78 Pac. 624
(1904).
20. Eby v. Northern Pacific Rr. Co., 13 Phila. 161 (Pa. 1879); Common-
-wealth v. Texas & Pacific Rr. Co., 98 Pa. 90 (1881).
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Congressional action there is no reason why a state court should hesitate to
apply its service of process statutes to federal corporations. The Supreme
Court and the lower federal courts have said nothing to forbid it; on the
contrary they have approved recurrent attempts to substitute for outworn
doctrine in the matter a rule of practical convenience, 21
VALIDITY OF TRUSTS Ix FAVOR OF ANIIALS
IN a recent New York decision a testamentary trust established for the benefit
of, and limited upon the lives of, five household pets and one human
being was declared invalid on the ground that such a trust violated the New
York statute forbidding the suspension of the absolute ownership of personal
property for a period longer than two lives in being.1 The common law rule
against perpetuities insofar as it forbids only remoteness of vesting would
not apply to the instant case, since the interest following the trust for the
domestic animals was vested.2 More serious difficulty is encountered in the
general requirement that every non-charitable trust have a definite ccstui who
can demand its enforcement.3 This objection would be avoided if the trust
in the instant case could be considered charitable; 4 but the rule that a charit-
able trust must be for the benefit of the public rather than for definite or
ascertainable persons seems to preclude such a possibility. 5
But classification of the trust in the principal case as charitable is not
essential to its validity, since the trustee has been held privileged to perform
in several types of non-charitable trusts, primarily those for funerals, monu-
ments, manumission, and masses, without a cestui who could demand en-
forcement.6 According to one commentator funeral expenses, the only real
21. Sugg v. Thornton, supra note 10; Barrow Steamship Co. v. Kane;
International Harvester Co. v. Kentucky, both supra note 8; Smolik v. Phila-
delphia & Reading Coal & Iron Co.) sUpra note 9.
1. iA re Howells' Estate, 145 Misc. 557, 260 N. Y. Supp. 598 (Sur. Ct. 1932).
2. Whether such 'trusts are limited in duration by the rule against per-
petulties itself or by a distinct rule created for the purpose, need not be
discussed as the result is the same in either case. See Smith, Honorary Truigs
and the Rule Against Perpetuities (1930) 30 COL. L. REv. 60.
3. Filkins v. Sovern, 127 Iowa 738, 104 N. W. 346 (1905); In re Catlin,
97 Misc. 223, 160 N. Y. Supp. 1034 (Sur. Ct. 1916).
4. Ripley v. Brown, 218 Mass. 33, 105 N. E. 637 (1914); Richtman v,
Watson, 150 Wis. 385, 136 N. W. 797 (1912). A charitable trust can be en-
forced by the Attorney General.
5. In re Dean, 41 Ch. DiV. 552 (1888). There is little authority actually in
point. Trusts for the benefit of animals in general are charitable, It re
Coleman's Estate, 167 Cal. 212, 138 Pac. 992 (1914); In re Estate of Graves,
242 Ill. 23, 89 N. E. 672 (1909).
6. Lawrence v. Presser, 89 N. J. Eq. 248, 104 Atl. 772 (1918); Keasbey,
Gifts for Public Monuments (1920) 29 YALE L. J. 729; Abercrombie v. Aber-
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exception to the cestui requirement, include trusts for monuments, while masses
and manumission are treated as charities.7 This theory succeeds in eliminating
all but one of the above exceptions to the ccstui requirement only to expand
the concepts of charity and funeral expenses to include the others; 3 further-
more, it does not account for other non-charitable trusts which have been
upheld.8 The suggestion of another commentator that when such "honorary"
trusts are for a legal purpose the court should not interfere, at the behest of
an unscrupulous heir, with a trustee who is willing to perform,'0 provides a
general rule so broad that it includes many situations in which the definite
ceshii requirement has been properly upheld." Perhaps the most feasible
theory is to accept those exceptions which have received judicial recognition
and to create others only if, as, and when the need is clearly demonztrated.
Three English cases and one Irish ease provide authority for including trusts
for domestic animals in the exceptions to the cestui requirement.' 2
A further difficulty is encountered in the uncertain duration of trusts ex-
cepted from the requirement of a definite ccstuL The courts that have upheld
these trusts seem to feel that they should be limited to the period permitted
by the rule against perpetuities.' 3  Inasmuch as the life expectancy of a dog
crombie, 27 Ala. 489 (1855); Wilmes v. Tiernay, 187 Iowa 390, 174 N. W.
271 (1919); Note (1919) 5 IowA L. BuLL. 253.
7. Gray, Gifts for a Non-charitablc Parposc (1902) 15 HYV. L. Rlv. 509.
8. it is not apparent that the liberation of a slave or the saying of maZses
for the soul of the testator is of benefit to the public, though the latter may
be considered a religious service. Nor is the erection of a monument when
not expressly authorized a proper charge against an estate.
9. For example trusts have been held valid w.hen for unincorporated
voluntarj associations [Penny v. Central Coal and Coke Co., 133 Fed. 769
(C. C. A. 8th, 1905); Partridge, The Legal Statis of a College Fratenai!y
Chpter (1908) 42 Ami. L. REv. 168, 180], for an Indian tribe [Ruddich: v.
Albertson, 154 Cal. 640, 98 Pac. 1045 (1908)], for the purchase of an advowson
[Gott v. Nairne, 3 Ch. Div. 278 (1876)], and for support of animals [cases
cited in ra note 12]. It is not likely that Gray's theory will be adopted. See
Clark, Uzenforccable Trusts and the Rule Against Pcrpetuitics (1911) 10
MICH. L. REv. 31.
10. Ames, The Failure of the "Tilden Tfist" (1892) 5 HAv. L. REV. 389.
11. As stated by Ames, supra note 10, at 392, his rationale opposes the
doctrine of Morice v. Bishop of Durham, 9 Ves. 099, 10 Veo. 522 (195),
followed in cases cited therein.
12. Mitford v. Reynolds, 16 Sim. 105, 1 Ph. 185 (1848) (trin't for horzes
allowed without discussion of its validity or duration) ; Pettingall v. Pettingall,
11 L. J. Eq. n.s. 176 (1842) (validity of trust for mare uncontested); Re Dean,
41 Ch. Div. 552 (1888) (trust for horses and hounds apparently allowed for
fifty years); Cleary v. Dillon, 1932 Irish Rep. 255 (trust for dogs allowed for
twenty-one years). In Willett v. Willett, 197 Ky. 663, 247 S. W. 739 (1023),
a similar result was reached on the basis of a statute exempting both trusts
for humane purposes and those for charities from the definite cesti require-
ment. See Note (1925) 31 CAsn iND Com.i. 8.
13. The cases so indicating are collected and deplored in Sweet, Restraints
on Alienation (1917) 33 LAW Q. REv. 342, 359. See Warren, The Proprcga of
is much shorter than that of a man, a trust limited on the life of a dog would
not contravene the policy of the rule. But although dogs are definite "persons"
so that trusts in their favor may not be considered charitable, they are said
not to have "lives" within the meaning of the rule against perpetuites.1 4 Trusts
limited on their lives are therefore void. The reason for thus invalidating these
trusts seems to be a vague fear that if testators are allowed to limit trusts on
the lives of dogs, they may begin limiting them on the lives of favorite carp,
crows, crocodiles, and California conifers. 15 Although the ingenuity of the
commentators could, no doubt, be depended upon to devise a technique for
distinguishing crocodiles and crows from dogs, the decision that dogs don't
live for purposes of the rule against perpetuities 10 may be justified as furthering
the simplicity of the rule. But trusts for animals can still be allowed for a
period of twenty-one years where the common law rule against perpetuities is
in force, if the testator's intent was that the trust be severable.17
The trust in the instant case was governed by the New York statute modifying
the rule against perpetuities and forbidding suspension of the absolute owner-
ship of personal property for longer than two lives in being.'8 Absolute owner-
ship is suspended if there are no persons who can convey an absolute interest.19
It could hardly be questioned that dogs are unable to join in a conveyance,
and since the power given to the trustee in the instant case to reinvest does
not satisfy the statute,20 the trust was properly held void. A testator can,
the Law (1921) 34 HARv. L. REv. 639, 647. Smith, Honorary Trusts and the
Rule Against Perpetuities (1930) 30 CoL. L. Rnv. 60, contends that this is
simply an applicatibn of the rule against perpetuities.
14. So stated in Cleary v. Dillon, supra note 12, at 260; Note (1933) 46
HARv. L. REv. 1036.
15. Such forebodings are found in Gray, Gifts for a Non-charitable Purpose
(1902) 15 HARv. L. REv. 509, 530, and in Cleary v. Dillon, supra note 12, at 201.
16. Nor, in all probability, do they have periods of gestation as contemplated
by that rule. Ever since it became established at common law that there
could be no larceny of a dog because of his base nature and unsuitability for
food, but that there could be larceny of a dead dog's skin, the judicial treat-
ment of dogs has been erratic to say the least. Dogs have been held to be
on a plane with cats, monkeys, and parrots; to be instruments of music, to
be of no value, worth a seal skin coat, or a Jersey cow, or $125,000 dead; to
be ferae naturae but also ferae domesticae; to go to the heirs as well as to the
administrator; to be harmless and docile but presumptively the aggressor in a
fight with a man; to be best beloved of all pets but not a fellow servant or
equipment and tools; to be entitled to one free bite but liable for double the
damages caused by every succeeding bite. This is the law; the authorities
will be found in 40 L. R. A. 503 (1897).
17. Authority must again be supplied by Cleary v. Dillon, supra note 12.
See Clark, Unenforceable Trusts and the Rule Against Perpetuitios (1911)
10 MicH. L. Rnv. 31, 41.
18. N. Y. PERSONAL PRoPERTY LAW (1929) § 11.
19. Sawyer v. Cubby, 146 N. Y. 192, 196, 40 N. E. 869 (1895); see Wells v.
Squires, 117 App. Div. 502, 503, 504, 102 N. Y. Supp. 597 (1st Dep't 1907),
aff'd, 191 N. Y. 529, 84 N. E. 1122 (1908).
20. Belmont v. O'Brien, 12 N. Y. 394, 405 (1855). For a criticism of the
interpretation of the New York Statute see Whiteside, Suspension of the Power
of Alienation in New York (1927) 13 CORN. L. Q. 31; id at 167.
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however, provide for his dogs by leaving a legacy to any person on the condition
that the animals be cared for as stipulated, since in the United States condi-
tions are not subject to the rule against perpetuities. 2'
21. GRAY, RULE AGAiNST PERPETUITIES (3d ed. 1915) §§ 309, 310 et seq.
